As security of mobile apps is crucial to modern-day living, there is a growing need to help developers build apps with provable security guarantees that apps do not leak sensitive user information or cannot be exploited to perform actions without the user's consent. The current prevalent approach to mobile app security is to curatively address vulnerabilities after apps have been developed. This approach has downsides in terms of time, resources, user inconvenience, and information loss.
Introduction
Android apps are ubiquitous. They help us with critical tasks such as banking and communication. Consequently, they need access to our personal information. Hence, developers try to ensure their apps do not cause harm to the user. Despite such efforts, apps exhibit vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious apps either installed in the device or executing remotely. For example, in 2019, a vulnerability in Google's camera app allowed a malicious app without required permissions to gain full control of the camera app and access the photos and videos stored by the camera app [5] . A 2019 study [29] showed that approximately 11% of 2,000 Android apps collected from a couple of app stores, including Google Play, are vulnerable to MITM and phishing attacks.
In the last decade, researchers have developed a plethora of tools and techniques to help detect vulnerabilities in Android apps [26] . Even so, apps with vulnerabilities find their way to app stores because app developers do not use these tools, or the tools are ineffective. The latter reason is supported by the findings of Ranganath and Mitra [23] : from a set of 42 previously known vulnerabilities that plague Android apps, fourteen freely available vulnerability tools could collectively detect only 30 vulnerabilities. Additionally, Pauck et al. [21] assessed six prominent taint analysis tools aimed at discovering vulnerabilities in Android and found tools to be ineffective in detecting vulnerabilities in real-world apps.
Existing approaches to secure Android apps are curative, i.e., detect vulnerabilities after they occur. Identifying and fixing a vulnerability in a curative manner increases the cost of development [27] . Therefore, given the current landscape of Android app security, we are exploring a preventive approach that can help prevent the occurrence of vulnerabilities in apps (as opposed to curing apps of vulnerabilities).
In this context, we propose a methodology, SeMA, based on an existing mobile app design technique called storyboarding. SeMA treats security as a first-class citizen in the design phase and enables analysis and verification of security properties in an app's design. We demonstrate that SeMA can help prevent 49 of the 60 vulnerabilities captured in the Ghera benchmark suite [18] , which is more than the vulnerabilities collectively detected by tools evaluated by Ranganath and Mitra [23] (against an earlier version of Ghera).
Background
SeMA borrows heavily from Model-Driven Development (MDD) and UX design techniques for Android apps.
Model Driven Development (MDD)
In MDD, software is developed by iteratively refining abstract and formal models [3] . A model is meant to capture the application's behavior and is expressed in a domainspecific language (DSL). Apart from models, the domain-specific platform is a crucial entity in MDD. The domain-specific platform provides frameworks and APIs to enable easy refinement of a model into a platformspecific implementation. Since every aspect of an application can seldom be specified in the DSL, the resulting implementation is often extended with additional code; mostly, the business logic of the application.
Today, numerous tools exist to enable MDD in various domains. For example, Amazon uses TLA+ to develop web services [14, 30] . Mendix is a commercial tool that enables MDD for enterprise applications [8] . Tools like Alloy [13] and UML/OCL [24] help create and analyze models of software behavior, which form the basis for further development. Similar tools exist for mobile app development; most of them aid cross-platform development of mobile apps. Brambilla and others [4, 6] extended the Information Flow Modeling Language, a standard for depicting UI behavior, to enable the specification of a mobile app's GUI in a platform-independent manner. Heitkotter et al. [7] developed MD 2 to create cross-platform mobile apps in a high-level DSL. Vaupel et al. [28] developed an approach to model an app's behavior at different abstraction levels.
Storyboarding Android app development teams use storyboarding to design an app's navigation [22, 15] . A storyboard is a sequence of screens and transitions between the screens. It serves as a model for the user's observed behavior in terms of screens and transitions. Numerous tools such as Xcode [1] , Sketch [25] , and Android's JetPack [11] help express a storyboard digitally. The storyboarding process is participatory in nature because it allows designers to get feedback from potential users about the features captured in the storyboard and from developers about the feasibility of implementing those features. However, traditional storyboards cannot capture an app's behavior (beyond UI and navigational possibilities). This limitation of storyboards hinders collaboration.
MDD with Storyboarding
Existing MDD approaches to mobile app development do not use storyboards. Extending storyboards with capabilities to capture an app's behavior to enable MDD has numerous benefits. First, storyboards are becoming an integral part of the mobile app development process. Therefore, a methodology based on storyboarding can fit into the mobile app development life cycle. Second, an extended storyboard can serve a common substrate for collaboration between designers and developers to specify an app's behavior along with its UI and navigational features. Third, an extended storyboard can serve as a basis for formal analysis of an app's behavior. The abstractness of the models helps with the analysis because analyzing behaviors captured in an abstract model is relatively easier than extracting and analyzing the behaviors captured in code. Finally, the storyboard can serve as a reference for an app's behavior when auditing the app's implementation.
The Methodology
The proposed methodology, SeMA, enables the reasoning and verification of security properties of an app's storyboard via iterative refinement. The development process of SeMA is shown in Figure 1 . The process begins with a developer sketching the initial storyboard of an app. The developer then extends the storyboard with the app's behavior and checks if the behaviors satisfy various pre-defined security properties. The developer may repeat the previous steps to revise and refine the behaviors. Once the storyboard has captured the behavior as intended by the developer while satisfying pre-defined security properties, the developer generates an implementation from the storyboard with a push of a button. As the final step, the developer adds business logic to the implementation via hooks provided in the generated code.
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Extended Storyboard
A traditional storyboard used in the design of mobile apps is composed of screens and transitions between screens. A screen is a collection of named widgets that allow the user to interact with the app, e.g., clicking a button. A transition (edge) between two screens depicts a navigation path from the source screen to the destination screen. The basic structure of a storyboard defines the navigational paths in an app.
For example, Figure 2 shows the traditional storyboard of an app with four screens: Messenger, Contacts, MsgStatus, and SaveStatus. Starting from the Messenger screen, a user can either add contact numbers to the app via Contacts screen or send a message to all saved contact numbers.
A traditional storyboard does not support the specification of app behavior. Hence, we propose the following extensions to traditional storyboards to enable the specification of app behaviors in storyboards, i.e., enrich a traditional storyboard as in Figure 2 into an extended storyboard as in Figure 3 .
App Identity Every storyboard has an app attribute, which is a unique string constant used to identify the app described by the storyboard.
Extensions to Screens
Screens are extended with a mandatory name, optional input parameters (in green in Figure 3 .1), and optional URIs (in purple in Figure 3 ).
Input parameters of a screen are similar to parameters of a function in mainstream programming. Input parameters bind to the values (arguments) provided when the screen is activated by either another screen in the app via an incoming transition or an app via the screen's URI.
A URI associated with a screen can be used to access the screen from outside the app. A URI can have input parameters; similar to query parameters in web URLs. URI input parameters serve as input parameters of the screen. All URIs associated with a screen must have the same set of input parameters. For example, both URIs associated with the Contacts screen in Figure 3 , have the input parameter y. External apps accessing a screen via its URI must provide the arguments corresponding to the URI's input parameters. Every URI without its parameters must be unique in an app. see PhoneApp in Figure 3 . Such proxy screens have a mandatory name, a mandatory URI, and an optional app attributes. If app is specified in a proxy screen, then the proxy screen denotes the screen identified by the URI in the app named app. If app is not specified, then the proxy screen denotes any screen identified by the URI in an app installed on the device and determined by Android.
Proxy Screens of External Apps

Extensions to Widgets
Widgets are extended with a mandatory value that can be assigned by the developer (e.g., in labels), entered by the user (e.g., in fields), provided by an input parameter of the containing screen (e.g., when the screen is activated by a transition), or returned by an operation. Based on the displayed content, widgets can be of different types, e.g., a label and text widget display plain text while a web widget displays web content. Further, depending on the widget's type, a widget can be configured with a pre-defined set of rules that regulate the data displayed in a widget, e.g., a WebView widget can be configured with a whitelist of trusted URL patterns (via trusted-patterns attribute) to display content only from URLs in the whitelist.
Resources Android provides apps with resources with different capabilities, e.g., storage, networking. Hence, to complement this aspect, storyboards are extended with a pre-defined set of resources with specific capabilities that can be used by the apps being designed. 1 Android apps can offer UI-less services to other apps, e.g., broadcast receivers, content providers. Such services are denoted by custom resources in storyboards. A custom resource offers capabilities that can be used by apps installed on the device. Each custom resource has a mandatory identifier that is unique to the app. Each capability of a resource has a mandatory identifier that is unique to the resource. Also, each capability that has security implications can be marked as privileged. Access to a resource and its capabilities can be controlled via the access attribute of the resource. This attribute can take on one of the following three values: all implying any app can be accessed the resource/capability, user implying user must grant a specific permission to access the resource/capability, and own implying only the resource defining app x or an app that shares the digital signature of app x. For example, in Section 3.1, NOTIFICATION MGR is a custom resource that offers NOTIFY capability with a notify operation. Based on its access attribute, a client will need to seek the user's permission to use its NOTIFY capability.
Operations In an extended storyboard, an operation indicates a task to be performed, e.g., read from a file, get contents from a web server. An operation has a name, returns a value, may have input parameters, and may use a capability (provided by a resource). An operation is used by mentioning its name along with arguments and any required capabilities. For example, in Figure 3 , operation savePhone is used to save data in the device's internal storage by using the write capability of the internal storage device exposed as the resource INT STORE. A use of an operation introduces (declares) it in the storyboard. An operation is defined in the generated implementation (described in Section 3.4). Use of operations must be consistent, i.e., a non-boolean operation cannot be used in a boolean value position.
Extension to Transitions
Transitions between screens can be adorned with constraints that when satisfied enable/trigger a transition. A constraint is a conjunction of a user action (e.g., click of a button) and a set of boolean operations. A constraint is satisfied when the user action is performed (e.g., save button is clicked) and every boolean operation evaluates to true. For example, in Figure 3 , the transition from Contacts screen to SaveStatus screen is taken only when the user clicks the Save button and the savePhone operation evaluates to true, i.e., the value of Phone is successfully saved in "contacts.txt", a file on the internal storage of the device. As part of a transition, arguments are provided to the input parameters of the destination screen (in green 3). An argument can be a literal specified in the storyboard, a value available in the source screen of the transition (e.g., value of a contained widget, input parameter to the screen), or a value returned by an operation. Further, every transition to a screen must provide values (arguments) for every input parameter of that screen. For example, if there are two transitions t1 and t2 to screen s with input parameters x and y, then arguments for both x and y must be provided along both t1 and t2.
Multiple outgoing transitions from a screen may be simultaneously enabled when their constraints are not mutually exclusive. Hence, to handle such situations, all outgoing transitions from a screen must be totally ordered; see Contacts screen in Figure 3 . The implementation derived from the storyboard will evaluate the constraints according to the specified order of transitions and take the first enabled transition.
Security Properties
An Android app often interacts with other apps on the device, the underlying platform, and remote servers. Such interaction involves sharing of information, responding to events, and performing tasks based on user actions. Many of these interactions have security implications that should be considered during app development, e.g., can the user's personal information be stored safely on external storage? (information leak and data injection), who should have access to the content provided by the app? (permissions and privilege escalation), how should an app contact the server? (encryption).
While security implications are relevant, our current effort focuses on implications related to confidentiality and integrity of data.
Confidentiality An app violates confidentiality if it releases data to an untrusted sink. Hence, an app (and, consequently, its storyboard) that violates confidentiality is deemed as insecure. We explain the concepts of untrusted sinks in a storyboard in Section 3.3.
Integrity An app violates integrity if it uses a value from an untrusted source. Hence, an app (and, consequently, its storyboard) that violates integrity is deemed as insecure. We explain how a source is identified as untrusted in Section 3.3.
Analysis
There are multiple ways to check if extended storyboards satisfy various properties. In our current realization of SeMA, we use information flow analysis and rule checking to check and help ensure extended storyboards satisfy security properties concerning confidentiality and integrity.
Information Flow Analysis
This analysis tracks the flow of information in the form of values from sources to sinks in a storyboard.
A source is either a widget in a screen, an input parameter of a screen, or (the return value of) an operation. The set of sources in a storyboard are partitioned trusted and untrusted sources based on the guarantee of data integrity. Specifically, a source is untrusted if it is an input parameter of a screen's URI or it is an operation that reads data from an HTTP server, an open socket, device's external storage, or device's clipboard; or uses the capability of a resource provided by another app. All other sources are deemed as trusted.
A sink is either a widget in a screen or an argument to a screen or an operation. The set of sinks in a storyboard are partitioned trusted and untrusted sinks based on the guarantee of data confidentiality. Specifically, a sink is deemed as untrusted if it is an argument to an external screen identified without the app attribute or to an operation that writes data to an HTTP server, an open socket, device's external storage, or device's clipboard; or uses the capability of a resource provided by another app. All other sinks are deemed as trusted.
To reason about the flow of information between sources and sinks, we define a binary reflexive relation named influences between sources and sinks as follows: influences(x,y) (i.e., source x influences sink y) if 1.
x is assigned to an input parameter y of screen s on an incoming transition to s, 2.
x is an argument to operation y, or 3. value of operation x or input parameter x of screen s is assigned to widget y in screen s.
Here are few instances of this relation in Figure 3 . influences(y, Phone) because input parameter y of Contacts screen is assigned to Phone widget. influences(x,dispMsg) because x is provided as an argument to operation dispMsg. influences(dispMsg, Status) because the value of operation dispMsg is assigned to Status widget in SaveStatus screen.
Further, all data flows inside the app are guaranteed to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of used/processed data. The operations provided as part of the capabilities of custom resources provided by the app are assumed to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of used/processed data.
With the above (direct) influence relation, guarantees, and assumptions, we use the transitive closure of influences relation to detect violation of security properties. We detect potential violation of integrity by identifying transitive (indirect) influences (x, y) ∈ influences * in which x is an untrusted source. Likewise, we detect potential violation of confidentiality by identifying transitive (indirect) influences (x, y) ∈ influences * in which y is an untrusted sink. All such identified indirect influences are reported to the developer and must to be eliminated. Such an indirect influence can be eliminated by either replacing untrusted sources/sinks with trusted sources/sinks or indicating the indirect influence as safe by marking one or more of the direct influences that contribute the indirect influence as safe. 23 For example, in Figure 3 , the y parameter of Contacts screen is untrusted as it is provided by an external app. So, the analysis will flag influences * (y, P hone) as violating integrity due to the assignment of y to Phone widget in Contacts screen. A developer can fix this violation either by removing the assignment of y to Phone or marking the assignment as safe (as done in Figure 3 ).
Correctness of the analysis
The purpose of the analysis is to identify violations of confidentiality or integrity. This is done in two steps: 1) calculate the potential flows in the storyboard using the transitive closure of influences relation and 2) check if a flow involves an untrusted source or sink and is not marked as safe. Since the second step is based on pre-defined classification of sources and sinks and developer-provided safe annotations, the correctness of the analysis hinges on the first step.
If the influences relation correctly captures the direct flow between sources and sinks in a storyboard, then the transitive closure influences * will capture all possible flows between the sources and sinks, including all flows violating confidentiality or integrity. Hence, the analysis is complete in identifying every violation of confidentiality or integrity.
The influences * relation does not consider the effect of constraints on flows between sources and sinks, i.e., all constraints on transitions are assumed to be true. Consequently, the analysis may identify a flow between a source and a sink when there is no flow between the source and the sink (at runtime). For example, suppose a screen s has two incoming transitions i 1 and i 2 and two outgoing transitions o 1 and o 2 along with transition constraints that dictate transition o x must be taken if and only if s was reached via transition i x . Further, suppose an input parameter m of s is assigned a value along i 1 and i 2 and used as an argument along o 1 and o 2 . In this case, the value assigned to m along i 1 (i 2 ) will not flow out of m along o 2 (o 1 ). However, the analysis will incorrectly identify the value assigned to m along i 1 (i 2 ) may flow out of m along o 2 (o 1 ). Since the analysis may report invalid violations, the analysis is unsound.
Rule Checking
Prior research has developed guidelines and best practices for secure Android app development [20, 12] . Based on these standards, we have developed rules that can be enforced at design time to prevent the violation of properties related to confidentiality and integrity.
Following is the list of rules supported by the current realization of the methodology along with the reasons for the rules.
Capabilities offered by custom resources must be protected by access control. If any external client
can access a custom resource (i.e., its access attribute is set to all) and the resource offers privileged capabilities, then malicious clients can gain access to privileged capabilities without the user's consent. Further, Android's policy of least privilege stipulates that apps should have minimal privileges and acquire the privileges required to use protected services.
2.
WebView widgets must be configured with a whitelist of URL patterns. A WebView widget in an app works like a browser -it accepts a URL and loads its contents -but it does not have many of the security features of full-blown browsers. Also, a WebView widget has the same privileges as the containing app, has access to the app's resources, can be configured to execute JavaScript code. Hence, loading content from untrusted sources into WebView widgets facilitates exploitation by malicious content.
3. Operations configured to use HTTPS remote servers must use certificate pinning. HTTPS remote servers are signed with digital certificates issued by certificate authorities (CAs). Android defines a list of trusted CAs and verifies that the certificate of an HTTPS remote server is signed with a signature from a trusted CA. However, if a trusted CA is compromised, then it can be used to issue certificates for malicious servers. Hence, to protect against such situations, certificates of trusted servers are pinned (stored) in apps and only servers with these certificates are recognized as legit servers by the apps.
4.
Operations configured to use SSL sockets must use certificate pinning. The reasons from the case of certificate pinning for HTTPS applies here as well.
5.
Cipher operations must use keys stored in secure key stores (containers). The results of cipher operations can be influenced by tampering the cryptographic keys used in cipher operations. Further, since cryptographic keys are often used across multiple executions of an app, they need to be stored in secondary storage that is often accessible by all apps on a device. Hence, to protect against unwanted influences via key tampering, cipher keys should be stored in secure key stores (containers).
Realization of Rule Checking
Violations of rule 1 are detected by checking if a custom resource offers a privileged capability and has its access attribute set to all.
The trust-patterns attribute of WebView widget is used to specify the whitelist of trusted URL patterns. Violations of rule 2 is detected by checking if trust-patterns attribute is specified for every WebView widget.
Violations of rule 5 are detected by checking if the key argument provided to a cipher operation is the value returned by a pre-defined operation to keys from a secure container.
Violations of rules 1, 2, and 5 are flagged as errors and must be addressed before moving to the code generation phase.
Certificate pinning is enabled by default in every storyboard in the methodology. However, since techniques other than certificate pinning can be used to secure connections to servers, a developer can disable certificate pinning by setting disableCertPin attribute in a network-related operation. Such cases are detected as violations of rules 3 and 4. They are flagged as warnings but do not inhibit the developer from moving to the code generation phase.
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with "x" as argument. Figure 4 : Code generated for the Contacts screen in the storyboard depicted in Figure 3 
Code Generation
Once the developer has verified that the specified storyboard does not violate properties related to confidentiality and integrity, she can generate code from the storyboard. Figure 4 shows a fragment of generated code for the running example.
Mapping and Translation Rules
The current realization of SeMA hinges on various choices in mapping and translating storyboard-level entities and concepts into code-level entities and concepts. These choices are encoded in the following mapping and translation rules used during code generation.
1. A Screen is translated to a Fragment. For each input parameter of the screen, a function to obtain the value of the parameter is generated. If an input parameter is not available at runtime, then the corresponding function raises a runtime exception.
2.
A widget is translated to the corresponding widget type in Android, e.g., a widget displaying text is translated to TextView. The value of the widget is the corresponding value specified in the storyboard. For example, if the value is provided by a screen's input parameter x, then the return value from the getter function of x is set as the widget's value, e.g., TextView.setText(getX()). The value in a widget is obtained via the corresponding getter function, e.g., TextView.getText().
3. The constraint associated with a transition from a source screen to a destination screen is a conjunction of a user action and boolean operations. The user action part of the constraint is translated to a listener/handler function in the source screen that is triggered by the corresponding user action, e.g., button click. If the constraint has a boolean operation, then a conditional statement is generated with the boolean operation as the condition in the body of the listener function. The then block of the conditional statement has the statements required to trigger the destination screen. If the constraint has no boolean operations, then the body of the listener function has statements required to trigger the destination screen. If the constraint has no user action, then the checks corresponding to the boolean operations are performed when the source fragment is loaded.
We use Android's navigation APIs to trigger a destination screen. If the destination screen is a proxy screen, then intents are used to trigger the destination screen determined by the URI and app attribute. Arguments to destination screens are provided as key/value pairs bundled via the Bundle API.
When a screen has multiple outgoing transitions, the statements corresponding to the transitions are chained in the specified order of the transitions in the storyboard.
4. An operation is translated to a function with appropriate input parameters and return value. Each reference to the operation in a storyboard is translated to call the corresponding function.
The type of the input parameters depends on the type of the arguments provided to the function. For example, if the argument is provided by a widget that displays text, then the type of the parameter will be String. The return type depends on how the function is used. For example, if the function is used as a boolean operation in a constraint, then its return type will be boolean. If the function is assigned to a widget that displays text, then the function's return type will be String.
If the operation uses a capability provided by a pre-defined resource, then the body of the corresponding function will contain the statements required to use the capability. Otherwise, the function will have an empty body that needs to be later filled in by the developer. For example, on line 27 in Figure 4 , function savePhone contains the statement required to create a file in the device's internal storage since the same operation uses write capability of the resource INT STORE in the storyboard. Figure 4 , the generated code provides a hook for the developer to extend savePhone.
A developer can extend the generated definitions of functions. For example, on line 28 in
6.
A custom resource is translated to an appropriate Android component. The capabilities provided by a custom resource can be accessed via an Android intent. Currently, we only support broadcast receivers as custom resources.
7. The use of a resource in the storyboard indicates an app depends on the resource. Such dependencies are captured in the app's configuration during code generation while relying on the Android system to satisfy these dependencies at runtime in accordance with the device's security policy, e.g., grant permission to use a resource at install time.
Challenges in Property Preservation
Code generation offers two challenges to ensure the implementation generated from a storyboarded app does not violate the security properties verified in the storyboard.
Protect Generated Code Against Modifications
Even trivial modifications to generated code may lead to violation of security properties. One way to protect against modifications is to have a clear separation between generated code and developer added code. A simple way to achieve this separation is to store generated code and developer added code in separate files. This separation allows the fingerprinting of the generated code at generation time. While building the app, this fingerprint can be used to detect and warn the developer about potential modifications.
In the current realization of the methodology, while generated code and developer added code are stored in separate files, generated code is not fingerprinted to detect potential modifications.
Ensure Business Logic Preserves Properties
When developers add business logic, they may use the features of the app or the underlying platform in ways that violate the verified security properties. Such violations can be detected by using a combination of techniques such as runtime checks [16, 19] and app sandboxing [2] . For example, the storyboard shown in Figure 3 uses the read/write capabilities provided by Android's internal file system (INT STORE). A sandbox will ensure that the app only uses files in the app's internal storage.
The current realization of the methodology does not ensure the business logic does not interfere with verified security properties.
Canonical Examples
We illustrate the methodology with three canonical examples. Each example demonstrates a vulnerability that can be prevented by the methodology at design time.
Data Injection Example
Expected app behavior Consider an app p that allows users to log in and view their profile information. From another app, a valid user of app p can navigate only to the screen showing profile information. 4
Specified app behavior Figure 5A shows the storyboard of app p with four screens: Start, LoginFrag, Home, and Profile. In the Start screen, when the user clicks on the Launch button, the app transitions to LoginFrag screen and "Home" is passed as fragAddr argument. In LoginFrag screen, user can enter her credentials and click on the Login button. If the boolean operations verify and isFragProfile evaluate to true, then the app transitions to Profile screen and the return value of operation getToken is passed as token argument to Profile screen. On the other hand, if the boolean operations verify and isFragHome evaluate to true, then the app transitions to Home screen and the value of Email widget is passed as user argument to Home screen.
The Profile screen has an outgoing transition with a constraint based on the boolean operation validToken. If validToken evaluates to false, then the app transitions to LoginFrag screen and the return value of operation getFrag is passed as fragAddr argument to LoginFrag screen.
The operations getFrag and validToken consume the token parameter of Profile screen. The token parameter of the URI for Profile screen will be provided by an external app. Further, the token argument in validToken is marked safe because the developer trusts validToken to preserve confidentiality and integrity.
Security violation isFragProfile and isFragHome operations consume the input parameter fragAddr as argument. On the transition from Profile screen to LoginFrag screen, fragAddr takes on the return value of getFrag operation that consumes token parameter of Profile screen. Since an external app provides the token argument when Profile screen triggered via its URI, an external app can manipulate token to gain access to Home screen. Information flow analysis will detect and flag this violation by following the chain of flow from untrusted source and sinks.
Fix This vulnerability can be fixed by changing param fragAddr = getFrag(token) to param fragAddr = "profile" on the transition from Profile screen to LoginFrag screen as this breaks the dependence between the app's navigation and token parameter.
Data Leak Example
Expected app behavior Consider an app p that offers two screens to lookup the address of a person and save it. One screen supports name based lookups while the other supports SSN based lookups. Since the person's name, address, and SSN are sensitive; the app wants to ensure that they are not shared without the apps user's consent. Figure 5B shows the storyboard of app p. From Home screen, a user can navigate to either NameFinder or SSNFinder screens. In NameFinder screen, when a user enters a name and presses the Find button, the app transitions to Display screen and the return value of operation getAddr is passed as argument x Display screen. In SSNFinder screen, when a user enters an SSN and presses the Search button, the app transitions to Display screen and the return value of operation getAddr is passed argument x to Display screen. In Display screen, when the user presses the Save button, the app transitions to Home screen if the boolean operation saveInfo evaluates to true, i.e., parameter x is successfully saved in info.txt file in external storage.
Specified app behavior
LoginFrag
Email
Login Password Security violation A person's address obtained from a trusted source, getAddr(), is stored in parameter x and is written to the external storage on the transition from Display screen to Home screen. Since all apps on a device often have access to all parts of the external storage, an app without sufficient permissions can access a person's address. This violates the confidentiality of data read from trusted sources. Information flow analysis will detect and flag this violation by following the chain of flow from sources and untrusted sinks.
Fix This vulnerability can be fixed by changing EXT STORE to INT STORE in the saveInfo operation or by marking the argument x to saveInfo operation as safe.
Insecure Configuration Example
Expected app behavior Consider an app p that uses a WebView widget to display web content from trusted URLs. The app allows execution of JavaScript code embedded in web content. The app also allows JavaScript to access the app's files. Figure 5C shows the storyboard of app p. In Home screen, a user can provide a URL and press the Load button to display the content available at the provided URL in WebView widget wv in screen Display. WebView is configured to execute JavaScript (JS) and access the app's files via the allowJS and the allowFileAccess attributes, respectively.
Specified app behavior
Security violation
Since a whitelist of trusted URLs is not specified for wv widget via trust-patterns attribute, JavaScript code embedded in web content available from an untrusted URL can access the app's files. Rule checking will flag this as a violation of rule 2.
Fix This vulnerability can be fixed by specifying a whitelist of trusted URLs for wv, e.g., wv.trust-patterns={*sema.org*}.
Implementation
Android JetPack Navigation (AJN) is a suite of libraries that helps Android developers design their apps' navigation in the form of navigation graphs. A navigation graph is a realization of a traditional storyboard in Android Studio. We have extended navigation graphs with capabilities that enable developers to specify an app's storyboard, as illustrated in Figure 3 , in Android Studio. The developer can visually represent the screens, widgets, and transitions in the navigation graph. While a developer cannot specify operations and constraints visually, she can specify them in the corresponding XML structure of the navigation graph.
We have extended Android Lint [10] , a static analysis tool to analyze files in Android Studio, to implement the analysis and verification of security properties. The analysis is packaged as a Gradle Plugin that can be used from Android Studio.
We have implemented a code generation tool that takes a navigation graph and translates it into Java code for Android. A developer can extend the generated code with business logic in Java or Kotlin. The code generation tool is also packaged as a Gradle Plugin that can be used from Android Studio.
Evaluation
We used the Ghera benchmark suite [18] to evaluate the methodology. Ghera has 60 benchmarks. Each benchmark captures a unique vulnerability. We used Ghera because the vulnerabilities in Ghera benchmarks are valid, i.e., they have been previously reported in the literature or documented in Android documentation. These vulnerabilities are general and exploitable as they can be verified by executing the corresponding benchmarks on vanilla Android devices and emulators. Further, each vulnerability is current as they are based on Android API levels 22 thru 27, which enable more than 90% of Android devices in the world and are targeted by both existing and new apps. Finally, the benchmarks are known to be representative of real-world apps in terms of the APIs they use [23] . Hence, the benchmarks in Ghera are well-suited for this evaluation.
For each Ghera benchmark, we used the methodology to develop an app with the vulnerability captured in the benchmark. Table 1 summarizes the results. The methodology prevented 49 of the 60 vulnerabilities captured in Ghera benchmarks. Of the 49 prevented vulnerabilities, 30 were prevented by information flow analysis and rule checking of the storyboard. The remaining 19 were prevented by code generation.
Of the 30 vulnerabilities detected by the analysis on the storyboard, 15 were prevented by information flow, nine were prevented due to rule analysis, and six were prevented by a combination of information flow and rule analysis. Two of these six vulnerabilities were prevented by rule analysis and could have been prevented by code generation. These two vulnerabilities relate to connecting HTTP remote servers and connecting to HTTPS remote servers without certificate pinning. While such vulnerabilities can be prevented by code generation, we chose rule checking in our realization of the methodology to offer flexibility in using HTTP vs. HTTPS and certificate pinning in storyboards when connecting to remote servers.
Of the 49 vulnerabilities prevented by the methodology, 28 can be detected curatively (by source code analysis) after implementing the apps. Detecting the remaining 21 vulnerabilities by source code analysis is harder due to combinations of factors such as the semantics of general-purpose programming languages (e.g., Java), security-related specs provided by the developer (e.g., source/sink APIs), and the behavior of the underlying system (e.g., Android libraries and runtime). Hence, many existing tools based on source code analysis fail to detect vulnerabilities in real-world apps effectively [23, 21, 17] .
In [23] , Ranganath and Mitra evaluated 14 security analysis tools based on deep and shallow analysis. While security analysis tools in isolation could detect at most 15 vulnerabilities, the full set of tools collectively detected 30 vulnerabilities. This suggests combining different analysis will likely be more effective in detecting vulnerabilities. Our experience with the proposed methodology suggests the same is likely true in the context of preventing vulnerabilities: a combination of information flow analysis (deep), rule checking (shallow), and code generation (shallow) helped detect and prevent 49 vulnerabilities.
The current realization of the methodology was not applicable to 11 benchmarks in Ghera. Of these, three benchmarks capture vulnerabilities that cannot be prevented by the methodology, e.g., unhandled exceptions. The remaining eight apps use features that are not yet supported by the methodology, e.g., Content Providers.
The current realization of SeMA is available in a publicly available repository: https://bitbucket. org/secure-it-i/sema/src/master/ .
Future Work
We plan to explore the following directions to extend this effort.
1. Study the effectivenss of the methodology in preventing vulnerabilities while developing real-world apps.
2. Study the usability of the methodology while developing real-world apps.
3. Extend code generation to preserve the integrity of the generated files.
4. Extend the storyboard with additional capabilities to help specify richer behavior, e.g., Content Providers.
Summary
In this paper, we have proposed a methodology that extends storyboarding and combines it with model-driven development to help build secure Android apps. The methodology can prevent developers from introducing confidentiality and integrity related vulnerabilities into Android apps. This is achieved by using information flow anlaysis, rule checking, and automatic code generation. We empirically evaluated the methodology against a set of 60 known Android app vulnerabilities. The methodology successfully helped prevent 49 of these vulnerabilities. 
IF
HighPriority-ActivityHijack
Low priority activity can be hijacked by high priority activity.
IF
ImplicitPendingIntent-PrivEscalation
Sharing implicit pending intent leads to intent hijacking.
IF
IncorrectHandlingImplicitIntent-UnauthorizedAccess
Not validating implicit intents grants unauthorized access.
IF
NoValidityCheckOnBroadcast-UnintendedInvocation
Not verifying a broadcast message exposes the receiver.
RC
OrderedBroadcast-DataInjection Accepting input from a receiver enables data injection.
IF
UnprotectedBroadcastRecv-PrivEscalation
Not protecting broadcast receiver enables privilege escalation.
RC
TaskAffinity-ActivityHijack Starting activity in a new task enables activity hijack.
CG
TaskAffinity-LauncherActivity-PhishingAttack Non-empty task affinity of launcher activity enables phishing. 
